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SMALL BUSINESS, RISING GIANT:
POLICIES AND COSTS OF SECTION
8(A) CONTRACTING
PREFERENCES FOR ALASKA
NATIVE CORPORATIONS
JENNY J. YANG
Under the Small Business Act, Alaska Native corporations
(ANCs) not only have special contracting status under the Section
8(a) Business Development Program but also enjoy additional
advantages over other small businesses. In recent years this legal
treatment has come under scrutiny and criticism due to instances
in which work under contracts awarded to ANCs without
competitive bidding has been subcontracted out to large
companies ineligible for 8(a) benefits. Two congressmen initiated
an investigation into these no-bid contracts awarded to ANCs
resulting in a report from the Government Accountability Office
as well as a Congressional hearing focusing on the issue. Both
appear to confirm much of the media’s criticisms. This Note
examines the laws granting special contracting advantages to
ANCs, the costs and benefits of these advantages, as well as some
possibilities for legislative and other reforms.

I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska Native corporations (ANCs) were established by the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA) to
1
administer land settlements in Alaska. Under the Small Business
2
Act, ANCs not only have special contracting status under the
Section 8(a) Business Development Program but also enjoy unique
privileges over and above other 8(a) small businesses. Most
importantly, ANCs are exempt from the dollar limitation on
contracts that can be received outside of the competitive bidding
Copyright © 2006 by Jenny J. Yang.
1. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601–1629(h) (2000)).
2. Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 631–657(f) (2000)).
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process that is applicable to other 8(a) businesses.3 In the past two
years, this legal treatment has drawn intense, mostly negative
media attention. In addition, a congressional investigation was
spurred by the grant to ANCs, without competition, of large-value
defense contracts that were then subcontracted to companies
4
ineligible for 8(a) benefits.
This Note will describe the legal edge that ANCs enjoy in
receiving valuable government contracts and will discuss instances
of alleged abuse. The Note will also show that while significant
potential exists for this edge to improve the economic status of
Alaska Natives, the unique access of ANCs to government
contracts undermines the policy of competitive access, imposes
high costs on taxpayers, and excludes other small and minority
businesses’ access to federal procurement dollars, while fostering a
dependency by ANCs that obstructs true business development
and independence and renders balanced reform difficult. Part II
provides a brief background on the history of the legal
establishment and economic performance of ANCs; Part III
explains the legal substance of the contracting advantages for
ANCs in the 8(a) Program; Part IV examines how these advantages
are used in practice, focusing on the subcontracting practices which
have drawn media scrutiny and a congressional investigation; Part
V describes the results of the investigation; and Part VI analyzes
the benefits and costs of the ANC preferences, some possible
remedies to address the problems associated with the costs, and the
potential difficulty of finding a balanced solution.
II. BACKGROUND ON ANCS
Any discussion of ANCs and their economic status today
necessitates a brief overview of their legal creation under ANCSA.
At a time when the legal validity of aboriginal rights and claims to
lands within the state was unclear, ANCSA was drafted partly in
response to rising pressures to settle these claims so that
development and transportation of the state’s oil resources could
5
proceed in legal safety. ANCSA extinguished all claims based on
3. 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b) (2006).
4. See, e.g., Michael Scherer, Little Big Companies: How Did Corporations
Like Halliburton Get Millions in Government Contracts Designated for Small
Minority Businesses? MOTHER JONES, Jan./Feb. 2005, at 26, available at
http://www.motherjones.com/commentary/notebook/2005/01/11_400.html.
5. See FELIX S. COHEN ET AL., FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW ch. 14 § A (1982); see also Ben Summit, The Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA): Friend or Foe in the Struggle to Recover Alaska Native
Heritage, 14 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 607, 613–14 (1997).
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aboriginal rights to land in Alaska by Alaska Natives against the
federal and state governments,6 and, in turn, it distributed forty
7
million acres of the land to Alaska Natives. A “Native” was
defined as a United States citizen who is “one-fourth degree or
more Alaska Indian . . . Eskimo, or Aleut blood, or combination
8
thereof.” Broadly speaking, ANCSA mandated that the Secretary
of the Interior divide lands in Alaska into twelve regions, each
including Alaska Natives with “a common heritage and sharing
9
common interests.” Twelve “regional corporations” and over two
hundred “village corporations” were created to select lands for use
within the twelve regions, as well as to administer their share of the
10
monetary grant. A thirteenth regional corporation was created
11
for nonresident natives, and it received money but no land. The
village corporations were to first select twenty-two million acres
from the thirty-eight million granted under the law, and the
regional corporations were to select the remaining sixteen million
12
These sixteen million acres were required to be
acres.
13
redistributed to the villages. Under the law, all resident Alaska
Natives received one hundred shares of stock in one of the twelve
regional corporations and also became shareholders in the village
14
corporations that were organized for their respective villages.
ANCSA also distributed $462.5 million of congressional
15
appropriations funds and $500 million in oil royalties to the
thirteen regional corporations, which were in turn required to

6. 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (2000).
7. See 43 U.S.C. § 1611 (2000).
8. 43 U.S.C. § 1602(b) (2000).
9. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (2000); see COHEN ET AL., supra note 5, ch. 14 § A.
10. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606–1607 (2000); COHEN ET AL., supra note 5, ch. 14 § A.
11. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(c), 1606(i). The thirteen regional corporations are:
AHTNA, Inc., Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, Bering Straights Native
Corporation, Bristol Bay Native Corporation, Calista Corporation, Chugach
Alaska Corporation, Cook Inlet Region, Inc., Cook Inlet Tribal Council, Doyon,
Limited, Koniag, Inc., Sealaska Corporation, Sitnasuak Native Corporation, and
Thirteenth Regional Corporation. Alaska Native Corporations, Organizations
and Informational Resources, http://www.alaskans.com/alaskanative (last visited
Nov. 26, 2006).
12. See 43 U.S.C. § 1611.
13. See 43 U.S.C. § 1611(a)–(b).
14. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606(g), 1607.
15. 43 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000).
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distribute the funds to the village corporations and to their
shareholders who had no ownership in any village corporation.16
The economic performance of ANCs during the two decades
after their creation was “surprisingly poor” with collective losses of
17
$380 million by 1993. Far from fulfilling their “impressive task of
18
improving the social and economic status of Alaska Natives,”
most of the ANCs generally teetered on the edge of insolvency
19
until the early 1990s due to the inflation in the 1970s, the costs of
compliance with ANCSA, and the costly litigation over its
20
As a result, mergers between village
ambiguous provisions.
corporations as well as between regional and village corporations
21
became a “tactic for survival.” Moreover, it became apparent that
the regional corporations experienced widely varying degrees of
success despite receiving the same grants of cash and land under
22
With wide ranges in dividend payouts and annual
ANCSA.
returns, some “provided hundreds of high-wage jobs for their
23
Native shareholders, while others provided none.” For instance,
as of 1983, Cook Inlet Native Association and NANA, Inc. were
generally successful, and Sealaska Corp. came in at 745th on
Fortune’s list of the largest corporations in America, while Koniag,
24
Inc. was having difficulty covering its bills. Notably, while ANCs
like Bering Strait Native Corp. entered bankruptcy by 1988 after a
series of bad local investments and Calista Corp. employed under
ten persons by 1991, Cook Inlet Region, Inc. made national
broadcasting acquisitions with partners “who were able to take
advantage of the Natives’ minority status to get prefenences from”
the Federal Communications Commission and earned more than

16. See 43 U.S.C. § 1606(j)–(m); COHEN ET AL., supra note 5, ch. 14 § A.
Hereinafter in this Note, “ANCs” shall refer to both the thirteen regional
corporations as well as the village corporations created under ANCSA.
17. Stephen Colt, Alaska Natives and the “New Harpoon”: Economic
Performance of the ANCSA Regional Corporations, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 155, 155 (2005).
18. Martha Hirschfield, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Tribal
Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE L. J. 1331, 1339 (1992).
19. See Summit, supra note 5, at 618.
20. Hirschfield, supra note 18, at 1339.
21. Id.
22. See Colt, supra note 17, at 156.
23. See id.
24. See Wallace Turner, Alaska’s Native Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
1983, at D5.
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“the combined cumulative income of the other eleven regional
corporations.”25
This fledgling state gradually changed, however, when
Congress took notice. Michael Brown, a chief executive for one of
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation’s subsidiaries, lobbied Congress
in the 1980s, urging officials to examine the poverty and
26
He found
unemployment prevalent in rural Alaska villages.
Senator Ted Stevens, who at the time headed the Senate
27
Appropriations Committee, to be particularly receptive. In the
1990s, the ANCs “dramatically improved their financial
performance,” moving from red to black in terms of cumulative
28
earnings between 1991 and 1998. A professor of economics at the
University of Alaska in Anchorage pinpointed their seizure of
“opportunities to provide professional and support services under
contract to federal agencies” as one of four factors that led to this
29
climb.
III. THE ANC “EDGE”30
A. The 8(a) Business Development Program
The federal government’s policy of encouraging the
participation of small businesses in government contracts was first
announced during the Second World War amidst a heightened
31
need to increase the industrial production base. Then, in 1953 the
Small Business Administration (SBA) was created to contract with
government procurement agencies to provide services and supplies,
to subcontract with small businesses, and to encourage
32
subcontracting by prime contractors with small businesses. This
institution was made permanent by the Small Business Act of 1958
(“Act”), which governed all types of procurement not just those

25. Colt, supra note 17, at 161–62 (emphasis omitted).
26. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 28; see also T. Christian Miller, Contracts
Take Alaska to Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at A1.
27. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 28.
28. Colt, supra note 17, at 162–63.
29. Id.
30. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Scott Higham, Alaska Native Corporations
Cash In on Contracting Edge, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 2004, at A1.
31. Small Business Assistance Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-603, 56 Stat. 351
(1942); see 48 JOHN C. MCBRIDE & THOMAS J. TOUHEY, GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS: CYCLOPEDIC GUIDE TO LAW, ADMINISTRATION, PROCEDURE § 48.10
(2005).
32. Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 232 (1953).
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related to civil defense.33 Under the Act, a “small-business
concern” was defined as a business “independently owned and
34
operated and which is not dominant in its field of operation.”
The Act created a “Minority Small Business and Capital
35
Ownership Development” program, commonly known as the 8(a)
Business Development or 8(a) BD Program, in order “to assist
eligible small disadvantaged business concerns compete in the
36
American economy through business development.” Under the
8(a) Program, the SBA has the power to contract with federal
procurement agencies, departments, and officers to provide goods
and services and to “arrange for the performance of such
procurement contracts by negotiating or otherwise letting
subcontracts to socially and economically disadvantaged small
37
business concerns.” The phrase “negotiating or otherwise letting
subcontracts” has been interpreted to mean that the SBA may
award contracts to 8(a) Program small businesses without using the
38
competitive bidding process mandated for the usual awards of
39
federal procurement contracts. These subcontracts may thus be
awarded either on a sole-source basis directly to a specific small
business within the 8(a) Program or on a competitive basis in a
40
competition restricted to 8(a) small businesses.
Under the procedures set out by the SBA, there are three
basic ways for a government procurement agency’s contracting
officer to offer an 8(a) contract: (1) through competition among all
8(a) businesses that submit an offer; (2) as an open requirement,
which means on a sole-source basis but without the nomination of a
specific business; or (3) on a sole-source basis, offered on behalf of
a specific business, in which case the procuring agency identifies in

33. Small Business Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-536, 72 Stat. 384 (1958)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 631–657(f) (2000)).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 632(a)(1) (2000).
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 636(j)(10) (2000).
36. 13 C.F.R. § 124.1 (2006).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2000); see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.501(a).
38. See 41 U.S.C. § 253(a) (2000) (stating that a procurement agency must
obtain “full and open competition through the use of competitive procedures” to
procure property and services); 41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(5) (stating that a procurement
agency may dispense with competitive procedures when a statute “expressly
authorizes or requires that the procurement be made. . .from a specified source”).
39. See Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 708–09 (5th
Cir. 1973) (holding that “section 8(a) . . . clearly constitutes specific statutory
authority to dispense with competition” and thus, “subcontracts under the section
8(a) program may be awarded on a noncompetitive basis”).
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(C)–(D).
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its letter a specific 8(a) business that it nominates to receive the
award.41 In the first case, the SBA then accepts the procurement
contract on behalf of the entire 8(a) Program, and the procuring
agency conducts the competition and evaluates offers received in
accordance with the procedures set out in the Federal Acquisition
42
which govern usual competitive government
Regulations,
43
contracts. In the second case, the SBA selects an 8(a) business to
receive the sole-source award, and in the third case, the SBA
determines whether the nominated participant is an appropriate
match for the sole-source award and may either negotiate the
contract terms on behalf of the 8(a) business or authorize direct
44
negotiations between the procuring agency and the 8(a) business.
In practice, when an 8(a) business becomes informed of a
procuring agency’s interest in offering a particular contract, it may
“pitch” or market itself to the agency to be nominated for the
45
award.
Federal agencies are encouraged to offer contracts to minority
businesses under the 8(a) Program because the Act also requires
the President to establish annual set-aside goals for contracts
awarded by all federal agencies to various classifications of small
46
businesses, including small businesses under the 8(a) Program.
Specifically, the head of each federal agency is to set the agency’s
own goals, not to drop below an annual minimum of five percent of
the total value of contracts and subcontracts issued by that
47
agency.
B. Legal Substance of Preferences for ANCs
48
Pursuant to its powers under the Act, the SBA has issued
regulations that contain the legal substance of the preferences for
49
The edge ANCs enjoy above other 8(a) businesses
ANCs.
consists primarily of their near automatic eligibility for the program

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See 13 C.F.R. § 124.502(a)–(b).
48 C.F.R. ch. 1. (2005).
See 13 C.F.R. § 124.507(a).
See 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.503(a)(2), 124.503(c), 124.503(d).
See T. Christian Miller, Army Outsources Security Positions, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Aug. 13, 2004, ¶ 29 available at http://www.adn.com/front/
story/5421063p-5357044c.html.
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 644(g) (2000).
47. Id.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 634(b)(6) (2000).
49. 13 C.F.R. pt. 124.
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and their exemption from the dollar limitation on the amount of
awards that may be sole-sourced.50
Eligibility for the 8(a) Program has two basic requirements.
First, to qualify for participation in the 8(a) Program, a business
must qualify as “small” according to size standards set out in a
voluminous and complex set of separate regulations, the details of
51
Generally
which are beyond the scope of this discussion.
speaking, for government procurement purposes, a business
concern must meet a variety of size standards based on employee
52
numbers, output or capacity volume, or annual receipts.
Second, to qualify for participation in the 8(a) Program, a
small business must be “socially and economically disadvantaged,”
which requires that it is at least fifty-one percent “unconditionally
owned” by and that its “management and daily business
operations” are controlled by: (1) “one or more socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals,” (2) an “economically
disadvantaged Indian tribe (or a wholly owned business entity of
such a tribe),” or (3) “an economically disadvantaged Native
53
Hawaiian organization.” “Indian tribe” is defined as “any Indian
tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community of
Indians, including any Alaska Native village or regional or village
54
corporation.” The Regulations explicitly define “Alaska Native
55
Corporation” as those created under ANCSA.
As a special subgroup, business concerns owned by Indian
tribes, ANCs, Native Hawaiian Organizations (NHOs), and
Community Development Corporations (CDCs) are entitled to
56
some benefits over and above most 8(a) businesses. For example,
50. See 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e)(1) (2000); 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.109(a)(2),
124.109(a)(4), 124.506. A full discussion of these preferences follows.
51. See generally 13 C.F.R. pt. 121 (2006).
52. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 121.201, 121.401, 121.402.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4) (2000); see also 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.105–106. In
addition, the applicant must have “reasonable prospects for success in competing
in the private sector if admitted” to the program as well as demonstrate good
character. 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.107–108(a). “Economically disadvantaged individuals
are those socially disadvantaged individuals whose ability to compete in the free
enterprise system has been impaired due to diminished capital and credit
opportunities as compared to others in the same business area who are not socially
disadvantaged.” 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(6). To show oneself “economically
disadvantaged,” individuals must submit a narrative statement and personal
financial information. 13 C.F.R. § 124.104.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(13); see also 13 C.F.R. § 124.3.
55. 13 C.F.R. § 124.3.
56. Compare 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.105–108 (ownership, control, potential for
success, and good character requirements) with §§ 124.109–111 (requirements with
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they all benefit from a special exemption from the affiliate rule in
size determinations.
In determining the size of most 8(a)
businesses, the SBA includes the employees, receipts, or other
measures of size for all the business’s foreign and domestic
57
affiliates. For businesses owned and controlled by ANCs and
Indian tribes, however, the size of the business is “determined
independently without regard to its affiliation with the tribe, any
entity of the tribal government, or any other business enterprise
owned by the tribe,” unless one of these businesses might obtain “a
58
substantial unfair competitive advantage . . . .” Similar rules apply
59
to businesses owned by NHOs and CDCs. Therefore, businesses
owned by ANCs, Indian tribes, NHOs, and CDCs are less likely to
60
be ineligible on account of size.
Moreover, the structure of the definition of “socially and
economically disadvantaged” indicates that those businesses falling
under categories (2) and (3) are effectively exempted from
61
Under these guidelines
demonstrating social disadvantage.
Native Americans (including American Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts,
and Native Hawaiians), Black Americans, Hispanic Americans,
and Asian Pacific Americans are all presumed to be “socially
62
disadvantaged.” Individuals not belonging to these groups must
demonstrate their social disadvantage through a long list of
63
evidentiary requirements. Those individuals not belonging to one
of these groups are clearly at a disadvantage as the burden is
shifted to them to prove that they qualify as disadvantaged.
Furthermore, they all are exempt from the requirement that
persons conducting the 8(a) business’s management and daily
operations be disadvantaged persons as defined under the
64
So, while the regulations require that a triballyregulations.

respect to the same four items for concerns owned by Indian tribes, NHOs, and
CDCs, respectively).
57. 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(a)(6).
58. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(2)(iii).
59. 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.110(b), 124.111(c).
60. See Size Appeals of: Valenzuela Eng’g, Inc. and Curry Contracting Co.,
No. 4151 (SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals Feb. 23, 1996), available at
http://www.sba.gov/oha/allcases/sizecases/siz-4151.txt (denying a size protest
against SMI, a wholly-owned subsidiary of The Aleut Corp., a regional
corporation, that was based on a claim that it was affiliated with another wholly
owned subsidiary of The Aleut Corp.).
61. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109.
62. 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(b).
63. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(c).
64. 13 C.F.R. § 124.106.
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owned business be controlled by the tribe through a disadvantaged
individual, non-tribal members may also manage the business if the
65
SBA determines that this is required to assist its development.
Finally, businesses owned by Indian tribes, ANCs, NHOs, and
CDCs are all exempt from the limitation on ownership of multiple
8(a) businesses. For most 8(a) businesses, participants may not
own more than a ten to twenty percent ownership interest in
66
another 8(a) business. Indian tribes, ANCs, NHOs, and CDCs,
however, are prohibited only from owning more than fifty-one
percent of another 8(a) business in the same primary line of
67
business. Additionally, they may own an unlimited number of
other 8(a) businesses that are in a different primary line of
business, even if those other businesses have a secondary line of
business identical to the primary business of the original 8(a)
68
company.
Additionally, businesses owned by ANCs and Indian tribes
enjoy particularly preferential status. While the language of the
provisions governing NHOs and CDCs still requires them to meet
all eligibility criteria that apply to 8(a) businesses—as long as those
criteria do not conflict with the special provisions for them—the
provisions governing businesses owned by Indian tribes and ANCs
69
contain no similar language. This effectively means that NHOs
and CDCs are subject to much more detailed requirements than
70
Indian tribes and ANCs.
Even among tribally-owned businesses, businesses owned by
ANCs enjoy unique eligibility benefits that make them a very
71
specific and small group of especially privileged 8(a) beneficiaries.
Like other businesses owned by Indian tribes, businesses owned by
ANCs must meet size requirements applicable to all 8(a)
72
But while Indian tribe-owned businesses must
participants.
establish economic disadvantage, ANCs and the businesses they
own by a majority are automatically deemed to be economically

65. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(4).
66. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(g)–(h). The precise percentage of this limitation
depends on disadvantaged status and other circumstances. Id.
67. 13 C.F.R. §§124.109(c)(3)(ii), 124.110(c), 124.111(d).
68. 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.109(c)(3)(ii), 124.110(c), 124.111(d).
69. Compare 13 C.F.R. § 124.109 (requiring that ANCs meet only the
requirements of § 124.112 to the extent it is not inconsistent) with §§ 124.110–111
(requiring that NHOs and CDCs meet the requirements of §§ 124.101–108 and §
124.112 to the extent they are not inconsistent).
70. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.109–111.
71. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(a).
72. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(2).
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disadvantaged under ANCSA.73 This is true as long as Alaska
Natives or their descendants own “a majority of both the total
74
equity of the ANC and the total voting powers.”
Arguably the most powerful preference for ANCs within the
8(a) Program is the exemption from the dollar thresholds for solesource contracts, a benefit available exclusively to businesses
owned by Indian tribes and ANCs—not NHOs, CDCs, or any
75
other small or 8(a) business. A contract cannot be sole-sourced
(in other words, 8(a) businesses must compete for the contract) if:
(1) a “reasonable expectation” exists that at least two eligible 8(a)
businesses will submit offers at fair market prices; (2) the price of
the contract is anticipated to exceed five million dollars for
contracts for manufacturing goods and three million dollars for
other contracts; and (3) the contract was not accepted by the SBA
“for award as a sole-source 8(a) procurement on behalf of a
76
tribally-owned or ANC-owned concern.” Thus, the structure of
these three requirements effectively exempts businesses owned by
Indian tribes and ANCs from the dollar limitations on sole-source
77
contracts.
C. Limitations on Constitutional and Procedural Protections
The advantages for ANCs in receiving government contracts
are amplified and entrenched by several factors that limit the
extent to which outsiders can successfully challenge individual
awards made based on those advantages.
1. Constitutionality. One potential way to challenge an award
made to an ANC is to question the constitutionality of the
advantages ANCs and other businesses enjoy under the 8(a)
Program on Equal Protection grounds. At least one court has
78
rejected this line of attack.
In 1995, the Supreme Court examined a federal practice of
giving monetary incentives for general contractors to hire minority
79
The law at issue presumed “socially and
subcontractors.
73. 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e)(1) (2000); 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(a)(2), (a)(4).
74. 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(a)(1), (a)(3).
75. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.506.
76. 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(a)(1).
77. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b) (explicitly stating that the SBA may award a
contract on a sole-source basis to such a business even where the anticipated value
exceeds the thresholds).
78. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. United States (AFGE), 330 F.3d
513, 516–17, 520–21 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1088 (2003).
79. Adardand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204–05 (1995).
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economically disadvantaged individuals” to include “Black
Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific
Americans, and other minorities, or any other individual found to
80
be disadvantaged by” section 8(a) of the Act. The Court held that
all racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and thus must
81
be narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest.
One might thus expect that the application of the 8(a) Program to
“Indian tribes” would be subjected, and fatally so, to strict
82
scrutiny.
The 8(a) provisions applicable to Indian tribes and ANCs have
not been directly challenged. However, a 2003 opinion by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, American
83
Federation of Government Employees v. United States, makes it
unlikely that a court would strike down those provisions on
constitutional grounds. AFGE upheld a provision of the Defense
84
Appropriations Act of 2000 that allowed the federal government
to bypass the normal award procedure for civil engineering
contracts for firms with fifty-one percent “Native American”
85
ownership. The court held that federal legislation with respect to
Indian tribes is a political classification subject to rational scrutiny
and that “Native American” in the law at issue actually referred to
members of federally recognized Indian tribes, a political
86
classification. At least two scholarly discussions have critized this
distinction between racial and political classification of “Indian
87
Further, the Act clearly contemplates its own
tribes.”
88
classification as one based on minority racial groups. Thus, even
through the Supreme Court has denied certiorari, flaws in the

80. Id. at 205.
81. Id. at 227.
82. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109 (applying different criteria to business concerns
owned by Indian tribes and ANCs).
83. 330 F.3d 513 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1088 (2003).
84. Pub. L. No. 106-79, § 8014(3) (1999).
85. AFGE, 330 F.3d at 516, 523.
86. Id. at 520–21.
87. See Jessica Lynn Clark, AFGE v. United States: The D.C. Circuit’s
Preferential Treatment of the Native American Preference in Government Contract
Awards, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 379, 398–404 (2005); Margaret B. Williams, Recent
Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit:
CHAPTER: Constitutional Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 983, 1000–03 (2004).
88. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.103(a) (2006) (“Socially disadvantaged individuals are
those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic prejudice or cultural bias within
American society . . . .”).
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AFGE court’s reasoning might leave the 8(a) Program open to
future constitutional challenge.89
2. Protests. Another possibility for curbing the impact of the
ANC edge is for other small and 8(a) businesses to protest
particular awards of contracts to ANCs. This approach is subject
to several limitations, however, and is, in general, unlikely to
succeed.
For instance, the only challenge known to this author to a
contract awarded to an ANC partnered with a large corporation on
the grounds that the combined entity no longer qualifies as a
90
“small” business was rejected. A small business receiving an 8(a)
contract and its subcontractor are treated as joint venturers and
thus are affiliates for the purposes of size determination if: (1) the
subcontractor “performs primary and vital requirements of a
contract” or (2) the prime contractor is “unusually reliant” upon it,
determined with respect to a set of factors such as who manages
91
the contract and what percentage of the work is subcontracted.
Thus, if a subcontractor performs too much of the work under the
contract, the joint venture between it and an ANC may exceed
92
small business size limitations. However, the only known protest
based on this argument has been unsuccessful on this point. A
wholly-owned subsidiary of The Aleut Corp. subcontracted an
award from the Air Force to Lockheed, a large business which then
93
performed twenty percent of the labor under the contract. The
SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals rejected a protester’s claim
that the Alaska Native subsidiary would be unusually reliant on
Lockheed and thus determined that they were not affiliates for size
94
The office emphasized that the
determination purposes.
subsidiary managed the contract and was responsible for the bulk

89. 540 U.S. 1088 (2003). Of course, even if these advantages are subject to
strict scrutiny, they might be deemed to serve a compelling purpose. See Carole
Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943,
955–56 (2002).
90. See Size Appeals of: Valenzuela Eng’g, Inc. and Curry Contracting Co.,
No. 4151 (SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals Feb. 23, 1996), available at
http://www.sba.gov/oha/allcases/sizecases/siz-4151.txt.
91. 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(h)(4) (2006).
92. Id.
93. Size Appeals of: Valenzuela Eng’g, Inc. and Curry Contracting Co., No.
4151 (SBA Office of Hearings and Appeals Feb. 23, 1996), available at
http://www.sba.gov/oha/allcases/sizecases/siz-4151.txt.
94. Id.
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of the work, and thus it performed “the vital and primary tasks of
the contract.”95
Another limitation on potential challenges to contracts
awarded to ANCs is the inability of “any other party” to challenge
the eligibility of an 8(a) business for an 8(a) contract before the
96
SBA “or any administrative forum,” in a bid or other protest.
This means that no competing contractor can challenge the
97
eligibility of an ANC for a particular contract.
Finally, the threshold for review of decisions to award
contracts to 8(a) businesses is stacked high against a non-8(a)
business wishing to protest the decision, even where the non-8(a)
business had been performing that contract for a long time. The
Comptroller General, which handles certain government contract
protests, takes the position that the SBA and contracting agencies
have “broad discretion” to select procurement contracts for the
98
8(a) Program. As a result, it will decline to hear any protest that a
contract should not have been placed in the 8(a) Program unless
the protester meets a burden of showing that the officials acted in
99
bad faith or violated a specific law or regulation.
This barrier to protest can be seen in how easy it is for an
incumbent non-8(a) business performing an existing contract with
an agency to lose that contract to an ANC when there are changes
to the contract. Under its own regulations, the SBA does not
accept a contract into the 8(a) Program if it would have an
100
Such impact is
“adverse impact” on another small business.
presumed to exist where an incumbent small business had been
performing the contract, unless changes to the contract effect a
price change of at least twenty-five percent, in which case the
contract is considered a “new requirement” and the protection for
101
In at least two cases where
the incumbent does not apply.
incumbent contractors protested the award of their contract to an
ANC under the 8(a) Program, they lost under the heavily
deferential standard of review despite close disputes about whether

95. Id.
96. 13 C.F.R. § 124.517(a).
97. See id.
98. OMNI Gov’t Servs., Nos. B-297240.2; B-297240.3; B-297240.4 (Comp.
Gen. Mar. 22, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/2972402.pdf;
Catapult Technology, Ltd., Nos. B-294936; B-294936.2 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 13,
2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/294936.pdf.
99. Catapult Technology, Ltd., Nos. B-294936; B-294936.2 (Comp. Gen. Jan.
13, 2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/294936.pdf.
100. 13 C.F.R. § 124.504(c).
101. 13 C.F.R. § 124.504(c)(1)(ii)(C).
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the requirement was “new.”102 In one case, the SBA even admitted
that it had failed to perform an adverse impact analysis as required
by its own regulations, but the Comptroller General denied the
protest on grounds that the failure did not prejudice the
103
protester. Even if the SBA had performed such an analysis, the
Comptroller General concluded, deference is owed to the SBA’s
104
The SBA interpretation
interpretation of its own regulations.
gives the SBA discretion to find adverse impact not to exist even if
105
These unsuccessful
the presumption for adverse impact is met.
challenges indicate that a heavily deferential standard of review
limits the usefulness of the protest system for incumbents losing
contracts to ANCs under the 8(a) Program.
IV. 8(A) ADVANTAGES IN PRACTICE
The use of the ANC edge in the award and performance of
sole-source government contracts has been a mixed story of rags106
to-riches and loophole exploitation. The advantages available to
ANCs and other tribally-owned corporations have been thought to
be responsible for a large jump in the value of 8(a) contracts in
recent years, which doubled from $5.6 billion in 2002 to $10.1
107
billion just one year later. The size of the contracts awarded to
ANCs and their partners has been a surprise relative to the original
visions for the program. Contracting officials at the Pentagon, for
instance, thought the exemptions for ANCs would be used to
procure “occasional small contracts, not as a way to bypass federal
competitive-bidding rules for $100 million projects” for “everything
108
Government contracts to native-owned
under the sun.”

102. See OMNI Gov’t Servs., Nos. B-297240.2; B-297240.3; B-297240.4 (Comp.
Gen. Mar. 22, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/2972402.pdf;
Catapult Technology, Ltd., Nos. B-294936; B-294936.2 (Comp. Gen. Jan. 13,
2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/294936.pdf (denying such
protests).
103. See OMNI Gov’t Servs., Nos. B-297240.2; B-297240.3; B-297240.4 (Comp.
Gen. Mar. 22, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/2972402.pdf.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Compare, e.g., Allison Connolly, A Tiny Alutiiq Village in Alaska is
Reaping Millions in Defense Contracts in Hampton Roads and Throughout the
Country as a Result of Laws Giving Its Company Preferential Treatment as
Restitution for Lost Land, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 17, 2005, at A1, with
O’Harrow & Higham, supra note 30, at A1.
107. Jim Snyder, Native Corporation Trade Association Forms, THE HILL, Feb.
9, 2005, at 15.
108. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 28.
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companies rose steadily between 1999 and 2003 and spiked sharply
in 2003, with the vast majority of the value of the contracts being
109
By 2003, when native corporations received $1.3
sole-sourced.
billion in such sole-sourced contracts, accounting for almost fifteen
percent of the 8(a) Program, the advantages and exemptions for
ANCs have made some small village corporations “rising giant[s] in
110
the world of federal contracting.”
The public attention in the past year and a half, however, has
been much more focused on a few high-profile cases of alleged
111
abuse of exclusive 8(a) privileges by ANCs and their partners.
Three themes seem to run through the recent flurry of public
discussion of ANCs and their 8(a) edge that may explain the
antagonistic atmosphere in mainstream media. First, as will
become clear in the discussion to follow, many of the most highprofile ANC contracts have been awarded by the Department of
Defense. Neal Fried, an economist at Alaska’s Department of
Labor, has noted that ANCs depending on Alaska’s natural
resources have struggled while “those that have joined the war
112
Since that agency annually doles out the
effort have thrived.”
“bulk of federal acquisition dollars,” any tendency to grant
contracts to ANCs somewhat reflects a trend in government
113
procurement as a whole.
Second, the fact that many of the largest contract awards have
been for work in security and defense implicates a heightened
degree of public concern in the post-September 11 world. Several
subsidiaries of ANCs have been sole-source awarded million-dollar
contracts issued by the Department of Defense for military and
114
reconstruction work in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as at home.
For example, days after September 11, a $2.2 billion contract for
management of information technology systems issued by the
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency was sole-sourced to
Chenega and Arctic Slope, two of the thirteen regional
115
Moreover, in
corporations, an award that “raised eyebrows.”
2002, the Customs Service awarded a $500 million contract for
109. See id. (Chart: Government Contracts to Tribal Companies).
110. See id. at 26.
111. See, e.g., O’Harrow & Higham, supra note 30, at A1; Miller, supra note 26,
at A1; Turner, supra note 24, at D5.
112. Connolly, supra note 106, at A1.
113. Major Thomas J. Hasty, III, Minority Business Enterprise Development
and the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Program: Past, Present, and (Is There
a) Future? 145 MIL. L. REV. 1, 87 (1994).
114. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 28–29.
115. Connolly, supra note 106, at A1.
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maintenance of customs inspection equipment on a sole-source
basis to Chenega Technology Services Corp.116 Chenega Corp., as
noted by The Washington Post, had “little experience” doing this
type of work, prompting it to subcontract to big companies with no
117
native ownership.
The third factor fueling negative media attention is the ANCs’
use of large multinational corporations as subcontractors. For
example, over $225 million in military construction contracts were
awarded to Olgoonik Corporation, a village corporation based in
118
the small village of Wainwright, Alaska. Much of the work under
these contracts is being performed not by Wainwright natives but
119
by Olgoonik’s partner, Halliburton.
The role of these large corporate entities illustrates the
primary criticism of the ANC edge: that it creates a loophole
through which corporate entities that would not themselves qualify
for small or minority business assistance may, without competition,
access work under contracts of unlimited dollar value by becoming
120
For instance, two names that
a subcontractor for an ANC.
surface time and again in media discussion of ANCs’ government
contracting advantages are Wackenhut Services and Vance
International.
These large security firms which have been
subcontracted by Alutiiq Security and Technology, a subsidiary of
Afognak Native Corp., and Chenega Corp., respectively, to fulfill
defense contracts issued by the Pentagon to install guards at
121
military bases across the country. Specifically, Wackenhut serves
as Alutiiq’s subcontractor, and, while they jointly recruit security
guards, they specify in the contract that fifty-one percent of them
are to be considered Alutiiq employees and the other forty-nine
122
Critics charge that allowing
percent Wackenhut employees.
ANCs to subcontract with the likes of Wackenhut and Vance,
which otherwise would not qualify for small business government
contracting advantages, has created a loophole through which these
large non-minority and non-disadvantaged corporations are able to

116. O’Harrow & Higham, supra note 30, at A1.
117. Id.
118. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 26.
119. Id.
120. See Leslie Wayne, Security for the Homeland, Made in Alaska, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2004, at C1.
121. Id.; T. Christian Miller, Army Turns to Private Guards, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
12, 2004, at A1; Jay Price & Joseph Neff, Tribes Reap No-Bid Deals, THE NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Nov. 28, 2004, at A1.
122. Miller, supra note 121, at A1.
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access enormous government contracts noncompetitively.123 So,
when the Pentagon awarded a contract with a face value of $194
million (and which could be worth up to $500 million with the
exercise of options) to provide security guards at military bases to
the Alutiiq/Wackenhut and Chenega/Vance joint ventures without
using competitive bidding, it was not constrained by the dollar
threshold on contracts that could be sole-sourced in this manner
124
because the ANC recipients are exempt from such limitations.
Thus Wackenhut and Vance have been called the “main
beneficiaries” of these deals because by partnering with ANCs,
they can access these multi-million dollar contracts on a sole-source
125
basis.
Such partnerships are indeed a smart move for both firms
involved, as the ANC might lack experience that its large
subcontracting partner can provide in return for access to the
contract. Thus “Alutiiq provided the contracting speed, and
126
With the boom in
Wackenhut provided the experience.”
contracts awarded to ANCs in recent years, partnerships between
these corporations and large multinational businesses also
“skyrocketed,” in a phenomenon described by federal procurement
127
experts as “a loophole gone wild.” Thus, critics complain that a
law intended to benefit ANCs is being used to extend special
128
advantages to non-disadvantaged corporations. Military officials
cite the urgency with which private security manpower is needed to
replace the soldiers being shipped overseas to Iraq, but critics
respond that “in the long run,” the no-bid nature of these contracts
is accompanied by “no accountability, no oversight and no
129
alternatives if the performance is not good.”
To further arm critics on this point, both Wackenhut and
Vance have lost bids on other military contracts when forced to bid
130
competitively. Thus these are not only corporations that do not
qualify for small or minority business assistance, but they are also
corporations that have failed to perform adequately in the
competitive process, implying that they are now accessing valuable
131
contracts they might not deserve. To add fuel to the fire, as well
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Wayne, supra note 120, at C1.
Id.; 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b) (2006).
Wayne, supra note 120, at C1.
Miller, supra note 121, at A1.
Scherer, supra note 4, at 26.
Wayne, supra note 120, at C1.
Id.
Id.; Scherer, supra note 4, at 28.
Id.
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as another layer of aggravation for watchdog organizations,132
Wackenhut’s foreign ownership and questions of its competency
have led to concerns about the appropriateness of awarding it
133
For instance, Wackenhut
important national-security contracts.
had previously been “reprimanded for underperforming” on its
134
other federal contracts at the time it received the Pentagon deal.
The strength of these criticisms has, in at least two instances,
“stymied” no-bid contracts of this nature. In 2004, a forty million
dollar contract issued by the Energy Department to provide
security services in Idaho nuclear laboratories was initially sole135
The contract was later
sourced to Alutiiq and Wackenhut.
withdrawn after Idaho congressmen opposed the deal, pointing out
136
that Wackenhut was accessing the work without competition.
That same year, the Transportation Security Administration
abandoned plans to sole-source a technology maintenance contract
to Chenega and decided to open it for competitive bidding because
“the competitive bidding process provides the right avenue to a
contractor that will provide the government the best value” and
thus is what the agency should do as “good stewards of the
137
taxpayers’ dollars.”
The culmination, perhaps, of the public scrutiny into ANC
contracting advantages took place in March of 2005 when
Representative Thomas M. Davis III (R-Virginia), Chairman of
the House Government Reform Committee, and Representative
Henry A. Waxman (D-California) jointly signed letters to the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) requesting an
138
investigation of defense and military contracts awarded to ANCs.
In similar letters to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
the Pentagon, and the State Department, they requested
139
The two letters
documents and information on such contracts.

132. See Serv. Employees Int’l Union, Case Study, Alutiiq’s ‘back-door deal’
with Wackenhut, http://www.ancwatch.org (click “Case Study” in the left-hand list)
(last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
133. Wayne, supra note 120, at C1.
134. Scherer, supra note 4, at 28.
135. Wayne, supra note 120, at C1; Press Release, PR Newswire, After
Criticism, U.S. Energy Dep’t. Opts to Keep Idaho Nuclear Lab Security In-House
(May 6, 2004).
136. Id.
137. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., TSA Reconsiders Technology Contract, WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 2004, at A4.
138. Scott Higham & Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Probe of Security Contracts
Sought, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2005, at A4.
139. Id.
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single out ANCs as the recipients of sole-source federal contracts
that have increased in number and value,140 a phenomenon said to
raise “important questions about whether the interests of the
141
taxpayer are being protected.” The letter sent to the DHS, the
Pentagon, and the State Department requested audits, price
reasonableness assessments, and reports for sole-source contracts
142
The letter also
awarded to ANCs by several defense agencies.
specifically requested documents, especially performance
assessments and decisions or justification documents, for several of
the high-profile, large-dollar-value contracts to ANCs, including:
the $2.2 billion contract by the National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency to Chenega and Arctic Slope, the Army contracts to
Alutiiq/Wackenhut and Chenega/Vance for security guards, the
Customs Service’s $500 million contract for maintenance of
customs inspection services awarded to Chenega Technology
Services Corporation, the Transportation Security Administration
to Chenega in 2004, and the $225 million contracts to Olgoonik for
143
Additionally, the letter to the
military base construction work.
GAO was accompanied by a list of specific questions requested for
review by the GAO, including how many native Alaskans were
employed by the ANCs to work under the contracts, whether
federal officials could be sure that the price of contracts to ANCs
was reasonable, and what the impact of ANC contracts was on
“native Alaskan” employment, income, education, and economic
144
development.
V. ANSWERS FROM THE HILL
Starting in the spring of 2006, the government began issuing
responses that appeared to echo and confirm the media’s

140. Letter from Tom Davis, House Representative and Chairman of the
House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, and Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority
Member of the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, to David M. Walker, U.S.
Comptroller Gen. (Mar. 4, 2005) available at http://www.democrats.reform.
house.gov/Documents/20040204161047-71446.pdf [hereinafter Letter to GAO];
Letter from Tom Davis, House Representative and Chairman of the House
Comm. on Gov’t Reform, and Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member of
the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, to Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def.,
Michael Chertoff, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., and Condoleezza Rice, Sec’y of State
(Mar. 4, 2005) available at http://www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/
20050304160958-87063.pdf [hereinafter Letter to DHS, DOD, and State Dept.]
141. Letter to DHS, DOD, and State Dept., supra note 140, at 1.
142. Id. at 2–4.
143. Id.
144. Letter to GAO, supra note 140, at 3–4.
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suspicions and grievances toward the ANC edge. In April, two
separate reports from the GAO singled out ANCs in citing
inadequate oversight in government contracting, one in response to
questions about the Army’s management of its acquisition
145
and the other in response to the letters of
program,
146
Then, in June, a
Representatives Davis and Waxman.
congressional hearing was convened to answer the issues raised by
147
the latter of these reports.
The April 2006 GAO report charged that the Army had relied
heavily and inappropriately on 8(a) sole-source contracts for its
program of supplying security guards to military installations in the
148
According to the GAO’s findings, two of the four firms
U.S.
providing security personnel under these guard contracts are
ANCs, and the Army sole-sourced contracts totaling $495 million
149
The criticism focused on the fact that the
to these two ANCs.
Army did this even though: (1) competitive procedural alternatives
were available that were not conclusively shown to be more
burdensome than sole-sourcing; (2) the ANCs were of dubitable
qualification to provide the contract personnel; and (3) competitive
150
contracts the Army used at the same time cost less. The report
also zeroed in on the ANCs’ practice of subcontracting up to fortynine percent of the work to large security firms, citing that $200
million had been subcontracted under the guard contracts as of
151
The report further criticized the adequacy of
December 2005.
the security guards being supplied under the Army’s contracts,
pointing to evidence of inadequacy in screening procedures and
152
Though these portions of the report
training of the personnel.
145. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ARMY’S GUARD PROGRAM
REQUIRES GREATER OVERSIGHT AND REASSESSMENT OF ACQUISITION
APPROACH, GAO-06-284 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d06284.pdf [hereinafter GAO GUARD PROGRAM REPORT].
146. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INCREASED USE OF ALASKA
NATIVE CORPORATIONS’ SPECIAL 8(A) PROVISIONS CALLS FOR TAILORED
OVERSIGHT, GAO-06-399 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d06399.pdf [hereinafter GAO 8(A) REPORT].
147. See Northern Lights and Procurement Plights: The Effect of the ANC
Program on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H.
Comm. on Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong.
(2006) (opening statement of Chairman Tom Davis), available at
http://reform.house.gov/GovReform/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=45302.
148. GAO GUARD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 145, at 2.
149. Id. at 8, 9.
150. Id. at 9, 13–14.
151. Id. at 15.
152. Id. at 16, 20.
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did not single out ANCs, the implication that the inadequacies of
the personnel can be traced to the inadequacy of the ANCs’
performance seems quite clear given the report’s emphasis on the
153
Army’s heavy reliance on ANCs for these contracts. The GAO
concluded by calling for stronger Army oversight of its contracting
process and urged among six other recommendations that the
Army “reassess its acquisition strategy for contract security
guards,” and, in particular, that it use competitive procedures for
154
contracts in the future.
The GAO report in response to the letters of Representatives
Davis and Waxman followed slightly over two weeks later and
reflected broader concerns over ANC participation in the 8(a)
155
The report provided some concrete data on ANC
Program.
participation in federal 8(a) contracts, painting a picture that
seemed to substantiate the media perception that the 8(a) Program
is a substantial part of the life of an ANC and that ANCs, in turn,
dominate the 8(a) landscape. According to the GAO’s findings, 4.6
billion total federal dollars were obligated to ANCs from 2000 to
2004, 63%, or $2.9 billion, of which were through the 8(a) Program;
156
157
Moreover,
77% of that $2.9 billion were sole-source awards.
the ANC share of the 8(a) pie appears to be growing as 8(a) dollars
to ANCs increased from $265 million in 2000 to $1.1 billion in 2004,
representing a growth from 5% to 13% of total 8(a) dollars
158
devoted to ANCs.
The central conclusion of the GAO report, however, is that
oversight by contracting agencies is unduly lax, particularly in
enforcing limitations on subcontracting of awards sole-sourced to
159
ANCs under the 8(a) Program. Rather than pointing to ANCs or
the firms who subcontract with them as abusers of the system, the
GAO focused on the inadequate oversight of contracting officials,
who are “confused about whose responsibility it is to monitor
compliance with the subcontracting limitations,” as well as “unclear
160
The GAO also
about how to monitor” such limitations.

153. Id. at 9.
154. Id. at 32–33.
155. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146.
156. The seventy-seven percent figure reflects GAO analysis of six different
agencies. Id. at 11.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 11–12.
159. Id. at 21 (finding “almost no evidence that the agencies are effectively
monitoring compliance with this requirement, particularly where 8(a) ANC firms
have partnered with large firms”).
160. Id. at 21–22.
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suggested that there is some conscious circumvention of the
system, citing contracting officers who say they are often
approached directly by large firms wanting to “partner” with
161
Additionally, there was as at least one allegation of a
ANCs.
“pass-through” contract in which an agency awarded the contract
to an ANC with the explicit requirement that a large firm, which it
actually wanted to use but to which it could not sole-source, do
162
“most of the work” as a subcontractor. The report also suggests
that some contracting agencies consider contracts with ANCs to be
an “open checkbook” and that they expect few checks on
163
compliance with the rules.
Blame also fell on the SBA. The GAO admonished the SBA
for failing to ensure that ANCs’ multiple subsidiaries were not
generating 8(a) revenue in the same primary lines of business,
164
which the regulations prohibit, failing to protect other incumbent
small businesses from losing contracts to sole-source opportunities
to ANCs, failing to make size determinations with sufficient
reference to whether admitting an ANC into the 8(a) Program
165
failing to
would produce unfair competitive advantage,
sufficiently monitor whether large firms are taking undue
advantage of partnership relationships with ANCs, and failing to
maintain adequate information on ANCs and their 8(a) activities in
166
general.
The GAO report concluded by calling upon the SBA to “tailor
its regulations and policies as well as to provide greater oversight in
practice” and for contracting agencies to “ensure that [ANCs] are
167
Several
operating in the program as intended.”
recommendations require the SBA to revise its regulations and
policies to amend the shortcomings pointed out in the report, while
requiring specific contracting agencies to develop guidance for
168
ensuring contract compliance.

161. Id. at 22–23.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 17. One contracting officer was quoted describing contracting with
ANCs as an “open checkbook,” referring to the lack of dollar limitations. Id.
Another contracting officer was quoted as saying he would be “‘laughed out of the
office’” for attempting to terminate an ANC contract for lack of compliance with
subcontracting limitations. Id. at 23.
164. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(3)(ii) (2006).
165. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(c)(2)(iii).
166. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 33.
167. Id. at 39.
168. Id. at 40–41.
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Though the SBA expressly disagreed with and criticized some
of the recommendations,169 three days after the release of the final
GAO report, it quietly published a proposed package of five
170
amendments to the 8(a) Program regulations. One of these
amendments would change the rules to exclude sole-source
contracts to joint ventures between a tribally-owned business or
ANC within the 8(a) Program and “other concerns” from the
171
exemption from the dollar limitation on sole-source contracts.
Another amendment would permit NHOs to secure defense
172
As for the part
contracts above the competitive threshold.
involving NHOs, the Department of Defense has followed through
cooperatively by adopting, in June 2006, a final rule amending its
own acquisition regulations to permit awarding sole-source
contracts to NHOs above the five million and three million dollar
173
thresholds. It remains to be seen whether the recommendation
to exclude joint ventures from the dollar limit exemption will be
174
adopted.
Yet another GAO report was released in May that
tangentially addressed the ANC edge in an investigation of waste
in contracting, concluding that the Army Corps of Engineers solesourced a $39.5 million contract for construction of classrooms in
the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 despite being in possession
175
of information that the classrooms should have cost much less.
The Corps, the GAO concluded, “could have, but failed to,
176
negotiate a lower price.”
VI. POLICIES, COSTS, BENEFITS, AND SOLUTIONS
These results of the congressional investigations as well as the
volume of negative media attention on the ANC edge call for an

169. Id. app. II at 53–54.
170. 8(a) Business Development/Small Disadvantaged Business Status
Determinations, 71 Fed. Reg. 23,498 (Apr. 24, 2006).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Sole Source 8(a)
Awards to Small Business Concerns Owned by Native Hawaiian Organizations, 71
Fed. Reg. 34,831 (June 16, 2006) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 219.805-1).
174. The proposal package is accompanied by no legal deadline. See 8(a)
Business Development/Small Disadvantaged Business Status Determinations, 71
Fed. Reg. at 23,498.
175. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE KATRINA, ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS CONTRACT FOR MISSISSIPPI CLASSROOMS, GAO-06-454
(2006), at 1–2.
176. Id. at 2.
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evaluation of whether the edge is still, or ever was, justified, both as
a policy and in terms of its costs. This question is inherently
complex because it requires balancing several distinct interests that
cannot be ordered and may not be compatible. These include the
interests of Alaska Natives (especially those in Alaska’s still
impoverished rural villages), the interests of other small and
disadvantaged businesses, the interests of taxpayers, the interest in
having affirmative action that is fair, and the interest in maintaining
competition in federal procurement. Such a multifaceted issue
does not present an easy solution, such as the complete removal of
the ANCs from the 8(a) Program, as some have indeed
177
suggested. The remainder of this Note is an attempt to untangle
the various competing interests involved in the controversy over
the ANC edge, in order to: (1) ask whether the edge makes good
sense both as a policy and in terms of costs and benefits and (2)
evaluate some possible solutions. Ultimately, this Note will show
that the most serious flaw of the ANC edge is that it fosters a
dependency by ANCs that is not only problematic policy-wise and
cost-wise, but that also makes any balanced remedies difficult.
A. Consistency with the Policy of the Act and the 8(a) Program
1. Unique Power to Circumvent Competition. The powerful
exemption of ANCs from the dollar limitation on amounts they can
receive on a sole-source basis makes them more disconnected than
other 8(a) businesses from the Act’s policy of promoting
178
The Act as a whole, as well as the 8(a) Program
competition.
itself, embodies Congress’s underlying policy of promoting
competition in federal procurement by fostering the ability of small
and minority businesses to participate in that competitive
179
For instance, the Act was premised on the idea that
process.
developing the potential of small businesses is essential to free

177. See Northern Lights and Procurement Plights, The Effect of the ANC
Program on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H.
Comm. on Gov’t Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Harry C. Alford, President/CEO, National Black Chamber of
Commerce, Inc.), available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/NBCC%20%20Alford%20Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Alford Statement]; Nat’l Indian Bus.
Ass’n., Senator Kerry’s Staff Scrutinizes Congressional Investigation of Alaska
Native Corporations, http://www.nibanetwork.org/ANC%20Article.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Nat’l Indian Bus. Ass’n.].
178. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(a), 631(f)(2) (2000).
179. See id.
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competition in private enterprise.180 Thus, it sought to ensure that
“a fair proportion” of federal contracts is allotted to these small
181
businesses. The 8(a) Program specifically was to serve as a “tool
for developing business ownership among groups that own and
182
The goal of advancing such
control little productive capital.”
development was also to encourage “competition among such
183
Thus, the purpose of the 8(a) Program was
suppliers . . . .”
grounded not in a minority preference policy but in a competition
policy of helping small, disadvantaged businesses “compete on an
184
equal basis.”
ANCs, like other 8(a) businesses, are able to circumvent the
competitive process for government contracts by receiving solesource awards, and their ability to receive such awards without
dollar limitation allows them to achieve that circumvention to a
185
greater extent than other 8(a) businesses. As a matter of policy,
this exemption from the dollar limitation is the most significant
benefit for ANCs and other tribally-owned businesses because it
marks the deepest cut into the ideal of “free competitive
186
enterprise.” Specifically, the dollar limitation threshold serves as
an important limitation on the ability of most 8(a) businesses to
circumvent the competitive process for government contracts and
receive them directly. Exempting ANCs and other tribally-owned
businesses from that limitation places them further away than other
8(a) businesses from compliance with the policy goal of free
competitive enterprise that was behind the Act and the 8(a)
187
Almost as if to highlight this question, the SBA
Program.
explicitly declares that no requirement exists that a procurement be
“competed whenever possible before it can be accepted on a sole188
source basis for a tribally-owned or ANC-owned concern.”
2. Fostering Dependent ANCs. Furthermore, the use of the
ANC edge in practice indicates that the rationales that justify the

180. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(a).
181. Id.
182. 15 U.S.C. § 631(d)(2)(A)(vi).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(1).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(2).
185. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b) (2006).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 631(a).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(2).
188. 13 C.F.R. § 124.506(b). The provision clarifies that, while a contract
cannot be removed from competition once it has already been placed there, it can
be granted to an Indian- or ANC-owned corporation without ever going through
standard competitive procedures.
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ability of 8(a) businesses to circumvent the competitive process are
not met in the case of ANCs.189 The 8(a) Program allows for solesourcing of awards to eligible businesses to “promote the business
development of” such businesses in order to train them to
190
This
“compete on an equal basis in the American economy.”
rationale is premised on Congress’s belief that, at the time of the
Act’s passage, small businesses were incapable of receiving federal
contracts through the competitive process and that encouraging
their participation in procurement by permitting them to partially
circumvent that process would allow them to eventually become
self-sufficient, viable businesses capable of competing effectively in
191
the marketplace. Consistent with this rationale, small businesses
that participate in the program “graduate” after nine years of
192
participation, or earlier if the SBA determines that they have
“demonstrated the ability to compete in the marketplace without
assistance” or that they are no longer economically
193
disadvantaged. In general, they are not then eligible to re-enroll
194
into the program.
In the case of ANCs, however, the legal advantages that allow
ANCs to receive enormous contracts without going through the
195
competitive process cultivate a dependency on those advantages.
For instance, at least one commentator has pointed out that the
ability to access sole-source contracts with no dollar limitation
“reduce[s] the incentive to develop the skills, infrastructure and
core competencies that are necessary to become a viable business
in a competitive market” and that this actually constitutes a
“disservice to ANCs” because the companies’ future generations
are not being “prepared for the day when ANCs no longer receive
196
For
special treatment or must compete with hungrier firms.”
example, should an ANC graduate or become so profitable that it
no longer qualifies for the 8(a) Program, it will not be able to
access multi-million dollar sole-source contracts, yet it will not have

189. See 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(2).
190. Id.
191. See Ray Baillie Trash Hauling, Inc. v. Kleppe, 477 F.2d 696, 708 (5th Cir.
1973).
192. 13 C.F.R. § 124.2.
193. 13 C.F.R. § 124.302.
194. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.108(b) (“Once a concern or a disadvantaged individual
upon whom eligibility was based has participated in the 8(a) BD program, neither
the concern nor that individual will be eligible again.”).
195. See Dave Nadler, Contracting Advantages Do Not Prepare Alaska Firms
for Future Competition, Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.fcw.com/article88164-03-06-05.
196. Id.
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developed the building blocks to win these contracts through
competitive bidding.197 This is because the sole-source awards did
not train it to compete, and the size of those awards did not force it
198
to supplement its income with other economic activities. Akin to
a transfer payment rather than a training program targeted at
economic sovereignty, the ANC edge in this way cultivates longterm dependence.
The GAO’s 2006 findings shed light on the possibility that
some ANCs, having outgrown the sheltered harbor of the 8(a)
Program, are nevertheless reluctant to wade into the open waters
of competitive contracting. In connection with its conclusions on
SBA oversight, the GAO focused a substantial portion of its report
on the sophistication of ANCs’ business practices. For instance,
ANCs engage in a variety of structural maneuvers in order to
promote their revenue-generating power under the 8(a) Program,
including the ownership of several subsidiaries, each of which also
199
participates in the 8(a) Program. They recruit non-Alaska Native
outside management to pilot their 8(a) operations (often for
compensation that is significantly higher than that of other
executives), hire marketing firms to help secure contracts, enter
into joint ventures and partnerships with non-8(a) businesses as
200
well as 8(a) businesses, and create holding companies.
It appears from the report that, using these practices, ANCs
have pushed the edge that they hold under the 8(a) Program to its
legal limits. The report singles out the creation of multiple
subsidiaries, each of which participates in the 8(a) Program, as a
201
“Key Practice.” It also gives examples in which a subsidiary has
been created in anticipation of the graduation of an existing
subsidiary or the expiration of that subsidiary’s 8(a) contract, so
that the new subsidiary will take on a “follow-on” contract to
essentially continue the work of the former subsidiary under the
202
This practice has continued despite the GAO
8(a) Program.
report’s less-than-glowing depiction of it. For instance, as recently
as August 2006, the National Guard decided to award Bowhead
Manufacturing a $300 million, five-year no-bid contract, just as a

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See id.
See id.
See 13 C.F.R. §§ 124.109(c)(3)(ii), 124.110(c), 124.111(d).
GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 25–32.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 28 tbl. 4.
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$50 million, five-year no-bid contract with another subsidiary of
Bowhead Manufacturing’s ANC parent company was expiring.203
The GAO’s dissection of ANCs’ business practices led to the
conclusion that the SBA has failed to “tailor[] its policies and
practices to account for ANCs’ . . . growth in federal contracting,
even though officials recognize that ANCs enter into more
204
complex business relationships than other 8(a) participants.” The
implication appears to be that as ANCs have developed into
sophisticated business entities able to use complex business
practices to maximize their revenue-generating power, they have
outgrown the protective shelter of the 8(a) Program, which must
now be adjusted to be less deferential to them.
The practices of creating subsidiaries to take on follow-on
205
contracts and of creating holding companies have the effect of
perpetuating the ANC’s benefit from the 8(a) Program when it
possibly has outgrown the preference. The circumvention of
graduation and other aspects of the 8(a) Program not only diverts
8(a) resources and opportunities away from new small
disadvantaged businesses but also hurts the ANCs by delaying their
entry into the world of competitive contracting. This can thwart
the development of any accompanying drive to prepare their
businesses to succeed in that world.
Thus, the ANCs themselves can be said to be adversely
impacted by their preferential access to government contracts. The
degree to which ANCs and their shareholders may flounder
without the ANC edge might be tested in the near future, as the
Army decided in April 2006 against renewing its security guard
contracts with Chenega Integrated Solutions and Alutiiq Security
and Technology in response to the GAO’s report on the Army’s
206
acquisition program. Both Alutiiq and Chenega have expressed
their intent to bid for the contracts competitively following this
207
decision. Whether or not they succeed may provide an isolated
but still important indicator of the performance of ANCs in a
competitive environment.
203. Pamela Hess, Analysis: $300M, No-bid Guard Contract, UNITED PRESS
INT’L, Aug. 16, 2006, available at http://www.upi.com/SecurityTerrorism/
view.php?StoryID=20060816-033059-5548r.
204. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 33.
205. ANCs engage in these practices in part to share administrative employees
between subsidiaries so that the subsidiaries may maintain a “lean staff” and avoid
losing their eligibilty for 8(a) participation due to size. See id. at 32.
206. Sam Bishop, Army Won’t Renew Alaska Native Firms’ Military Security
Contracts, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, Apr. 21, 2006.
207. Id.
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Finally, strong dependence on sole-sourced government
contracts may ultimately pit the ANCs against each other. These
preferences may invoke a race to capture the most lucrative solesource contracts, with intense lobbying between ANCs to be
nominated for them. The potential for this race was perhaps
foreshadowed by what one commentator called a “scramble for
money and power” in which villages and regions were “pitted
against one another” by ANCSA provisions that required regional
208
corporations to share natural resource profits with each other.
B. Costs and Benefits
1. Impact on Alaska Natives: Increased Jobs and Dividends.
The ANC edge has undeniably created jobs and sent dividend
209
checks to Alaska Natives. Statistics bear out the conclusion that
at least some of the dollar power of these contracting successes has
flowed back to Alaska Natives in the state. In 2003, for instance,
the thirteen regional corporations and the twenty-eight village
corporations collectively owned assets of $2.8 billion; made
revenues of $2.9 billion; employed 10,541 workers within Alaska,
2685 of whom were Alaska Natives; paid $78 million to
shareholders as dividends; contributed $7 million of charitable
donations; and gave $4.2 million worth of scholarships to over 2000
210
In 2004, fifteen ANCs with 8(a) contracts distributed
students.
$27.14 million in dividends; donated $5.39 million to cultural
programs; and paid $141 million to 7700 employees within the
211
Moreover, there
state, out of 27,800 nation-wide employees.
have been media reports of success stories involving benefits
212
derived from ANC profits within Alaska. Countering the strong
media scrutiny of Alutiiq in its partnership with Wackenhut, for
instance, is a lengthy article on the uses of Alutiiq profits, “[m]uch
213
From a half-million
of” which “have gone back to the tribe.”
dollar loss in 2001, Alutiiq’s net income exceeded $20 million in
2004, the year in which it received the defense contract when
208. Summit, supra note 5, at 617.
209. See Margaret Bauman, Report on Native Corporations Show in Revenue
Growth, ALASKA J. OF COM., Nov. 20, 2005, available at http://www.alaska
journal.com/stories/112005/loc_20051120031.shtml.
210. Id.
211. Press Release, Association of ANCSA Regional Corporation
Presidents/CEOs, Alaska Native Corporations Annual Economic Report (July 18,
2005) (available at http://www.chugach-ak.com/pdf/7136ANCSA2005report.pdf).
212. See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 106, at A1.
213. Id.
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partnered with Wackenhut, $8.8 million of which was distributed in
dividends to its 650 tribe member shareholders.214 This translated
to $17,100 for the average shareholder, “enough to buy a car or
215
Profits also go towards
make a down payment on a house.”
teaching young tribe members about the nearly extinct Alutiiq
tribe, as well as cultural programs, scholarships that help young
tribe members learn about their heritage, and even archeological
216
projects supporting heritage museums.
Moreover, the ANC edge is in a unique position to provide
jobs for Alaska Natives residing within Alaska. For instance, most
ANCs provide hiring preferences to Alaska Natives, cast in the
form of preferences for Native Americans, Alaska Natives,
217
These
shareholders, or close relatives of shareholders.
preferences benefit Alaska Natives in two important ways: First,
ANC hiring may prove critical to the employment future of a
young Alaska Native population, which will face a growing need
218
for jobs in the near future. Second, Alaska Natives practice, and
are highly dependent on, a mixed economy which combines
“subsistence economies,” including activities such as fishing,
219
hunting, and trapping, with modern jobs in construction.
Participation in a subsistence economy requires adherence to a
traditional lifestyle which makes workers less available for modern
220
This puts Alaska
jobs during the hunting and fishing seasons.
Natives at a disadvantage relative to incoming non-Natives who do
not tend to adhere to such lifestyles when they are competing for
jobs with non-Native employers who cannot or do not structure job
221
opportunities “to accommodate this dependence on subsistence.”
ANCs, on the other hand, “are uniquely able to structure jobs in a
214. Id.
215. Paula Dobbyn, Some Say No-bid, No-limit Government Commissions for
Natives are Unfair, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 19, 2006.
216. See Connolly, supra note 106, at A1.
217. James P. Mills, The Use of Hiring Preferences by Alaska Native
Corporations After Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 403,
404 (2005).
218. In 2000, over forty percent of Alaska Natives were below the age of
majority, eighteen. Id.
219. Lee Huskey, Alaska’s Village Economies, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 435, 447–48 (2004) (arguing that subsistence activities are important to
the “future of village economies” and “should not be thought of as the economy
of last resort”); see also Mills, supra note 217, at 408.
220. See Mills, supra note 217, at 408.
221. Id.; see also Huskey, supra note 219, at 457 (observing that village
residents “may choose only limited participation in the labor force because wage
work conflicts with subsistence activities”).
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manner that is compatible with the subsistence needs of their
shareholders and other village residents,” because their corporate
leaders, drawn from the Native population, “are keenly aware of
the needs of the shareholders in their regions and often participate
222
in the subsistence activities themselves.”
A second reason that ANCs might be in a unique position to
benefit Alaska Natives is related to what at least one economic
expert has deemed a limited potential for the efficient economic
223
This is
development of natural resources within rural Alaska.
due to the principle that the development of local resources can be
“economically feasible only if resources can be produced and
224
delivered to market at cost or below the current market price.”
The total cost of the resources brought to market will be increased
by the “small size and remoteness of the villages,” which leads to
lower economies of scale in production, dependence on imports,
225
and raised transportation costs. Moreover, high costs of capital,
due to “increased risk and transaction costs associated with doing
business in small, remote places,” make investment projects from
226
outside unlikely to earn a competitive rate of return. The lack of
profitable investment opportunities within rural areas explains a
limited capital flow from outside the state. Thus, with limited
potential for economic activities within the state to improve the
welfare of rural Alaska, the ANCs’ contracting activities on the
national and international levels may indeed be the best or most
227
efficient route to achieving that improvement.
2. But Not Enough Jobs and Dividends. The common view
among media commentators, however, seems to be that the ANC
edge has not trickled as much benefit down to Alaska Natives as it
228
One specific charge is that ANCs do not hire
should have.
229
enough Alaska Natives. For instance, in 2004, only thirty-three
of Chenega Corp. and its subsidiaries’ 2300 employees were
230
“Native Alaskans.” Moreover, a key criticism of ANCs’ practice

222. Mills, supra note 217, at 409–10.
223. See Huskey, supra note 219, at 456–60.
224. Id. at 458–59.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 459.
227. See id.
228. Scherer, supra note 4, at 26–28 (citing the opinion of a government
contracts expert that the ANC edge has produced profits for exploiting companies
rather than jobs for Alaska Natives).
229. See O’Harrow, supra note 137, at A04.
230. Id.
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of subcontracting to non-Native corporations for performance of
the sole-sourced contracts they receive is that, partly as a result of
these subcontracts, few or no Alaska Natives are actually employed
231
for the work. The SBA’s regulations do not require that Alaska
Natives perform the work under a contract to an ANC, and they
impose arguably weak limitations on subcontracting by requiring
that certain percentages of the work under an 8(a) contract be
performed by the 8(a) contractor in order “[t]o assist the business
232
Specifically, an 8(a) business
development of” 8(a) businesses.
receiving a contract under the Program must perform at least fifty
percent of the labor cost of a service contract with its own
233
Thus, an ANC would be in compliance with these
employees.
regulations as long as its subcontractor performs no more than
234
forty-nine percent of the work under a contract. For instance, in
the Alutiiq/Wackenhut partnership to perform the Army contract
for security guard services, the two firms jointly recruited security
guards to fulfill the manpower required by the contract, and in
their subcontracting agreement they designated fifty-one percent as
Alutiiq employees and forty-nine percent as Wackenhut
235
Therefore, though on paper the employment
employees.
arrangement complies with the requirement that the ANC provide
236
at least fifty percent of the personnel in the contract, no Alaska
Native need actually be hired. In fact, Alutiiq itself admitted they
237
only hired one Alaska Native guard. Similarly, Olgoonik Corp.
has subcontracted to Halliburton a portion of military construction
contracts worth over $225 million, such that much of the work is
238
being performed not by Wainwright natives but by Halliburton.
Critics observe that the contracts are being performed on a
national and international level rather than in the communities of
the ANCs and that “the only impact on Wainwright has been some
239
These
funds to remodel the town’s hotel and store.”

231. Scherer, supra note 4, at 28.
232. 13 C.F.R. § 124.510(a) (2006).
233. Other limitations include at least fifty percent of the manufacturing costs
of a contract to provide supplies or products, at least fifteen percent of the cost of
a contract for general construction with its own employees, and at least twentyfive percent of the cost of a construction contract by special trade contractors. 13
C.F.R. § 125.6(a) (2006).
234. See id.
235. Miller, supra note 45, ¶ 29.
236. See 13 C.F.R. § 125.6(h).
237. See Miller, supra note 45, ¶ 30.
238. Scherer, supra note 4, at 26.
239. Id.
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subcontracting practices have prompted one expert on federal
procurements to proclaim that he sees “little evidence that this
produces jobs in Alaska as opposed to profits for those
240
entrepreneurs skillful enough to exploit it.”
3. Padding the Taxpayer Bill. Another concern with solesource awards is that, due to the lack of competitive bidding, the
final contract price is higher than it otherwise would be; thus
“without competition it’s hard to ensure that taxpayers are getting
241
A government procurement expert has
their money’s worth.”
made an observation that strongly supports this argument, pointing
out that in many cases where the work is subcontracted out to non8(a) firms, the ANC is otherwise unable to perform the contract
242
Sole-sourcing such contracts to partnerships like
alone.
Alutiiq/Wackenhut inflates the contract price from the price that
might be obtained if either Alutiiq or Wackenhut were to win the
contract through competitive bidding on its own “by adding a layer
243
of overhead.” Thus, these sole-source awards result in not only
reduced competition but also inflated prices, translating into higher
costs to taxpayers. The vice president of policy for Taxpayers for
Common Sense, for instance, has called ANCs’ advantages “a
244
horrible deal for taxpayers.”
These charges have largely been borne out by the results of a
government inquiry in 2006. The GAO’s investigation into the
Army’s reliance on ANCs in its security guard contract program
pointed out that, in a “three-phased approach” to acquisition, the
Army contracted with ANCs in an initial phase, used four
competitive contracts in a second phase, and in the final phase
inexplicably reverted to the ANCs used in the first phase for
additional work despite knowledge that the cost per employee of
the competitive contracts was twenty-five percent lower than the
245
The latest development in this charge of
ANC contracts.
“wasteful spending” has taken place in the wake of Hurricane
246
Katrina when Representative Waxman wrote to the GAO again.

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Patience Wait, Tribal Companies’ Edge Stirring a Backlash? 24, no. 2
GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS 12, Jan. 24, 2005.
243. Id.
244. O’Harrow & Higham, supra note 30, at A1 (internal quotations omitted).
245. GAO GUARD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 145, at 10, 14.
246. Letter from Henry Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, House Comm.
on Gov’t Reform, to David M. Walker, U.S. Comptroller Gen. (Sept. 13, 2005),
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He warned that the history of no-bid contracts, especially in Iraq,
has led to “[w]aste, fraud, and abuse” that “appear to have
squandered hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars,” and that the
same appears likely to continue in “contracts for recovery and
rebuilding of the devastated Gulf Coast” since the first round of
247
He urged the
contracts had been issued without competition.
GAO to establish an audit to monitor contract spending for
248
reconstruction. His concerns were confirmed by the GAO report
249
in 2006.
4. Excluding Other Small Businesses and 8(a) Businesses.
Other 8(a) businesses that are not owned by ANCs or Indian tribes
also allegedly suffer from the advantages granted exclusively to
ANCs and tribally-owned firms. They are excluded from contracts
they otherwise might have secured through competition as well as
subjected to the dollar limitations on the amount of awards they
250
For instance, an African-American or
can be sole-sourced.
Asian-American-owned business could not be sole-sourced the
$500 million contract that was awarded to Chenega without
competition. This creates an exclusionary effect on the access of
251
non-tribally owned 8(a) businesses to contracts of such size. This
disadvantage seems to be borne out by statistics. For instance, in
2003, eight tribally owned businesses, including seven ANC
subsidiaries, made the list of Washington Technology’s Top 25 8(a)
businesses in terms of primary contracting dollars in the
252
information technology sector. Tribally owned businesses made
the top four of the top twenty-five, and that top four included three
253
subsidiaries of ANCs. A Chenega subsidiary came in at number
one primarily due to its $500 million, ten-year contract awarded by
the Department of Homeland Security to provide maintenance and
254
technical support for customs inspection equipment. Moreover,

available at http://housedemocrats.gov/news/librarydetail.cfm?library_content_
id=504.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HURRICANE KATRINA: ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS CONTRACT FOR MISSISSIPPI CLASSROOMS 1–2 (2006).
250. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.506 (2006).
251. Id.
252. Patience Wait, Tribal Companies Dominate Top 25 8(a)s, WASH. TECH.,
Sept. 13, 2004, available at http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/19_12/
special-report/24486-1.html.
253. Id.
254. Id.
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in 2002, ANCs constituted less than two percent of all small
businesses, but twelve percent of government contracts awarded to
255
small businesses were awarded to them.
These criticisms from the non-Alaska Native minority small
business communities have become even more charged after the
release of the GAO report on ANC participation in the 8(a)
Program this year. Harry Alford, president of the National Black
Chamber of Commerce, stated bluntly that the “ANC ‘game’” is “a
tool for avaristic manipulators” that is “reeking [sic] havoc on 8(a)
firms and the African American, Hispanic, Asian and, yes, the
Native American communities” and that ANCs “have become
256
Alford
predators on the minority business community.”
concluded by suggesting that ANCs be “separate[d]” from the 8(a)
257
program.
Leaders of the Indian community have responded with
charges of “business jealous[y],” characterizing such complaints as
an unfortunate backlash against the marginal success of American
258
Indians’ “catching up” with the rest of the minority community.
However, the force behind the exclusion argument is gathering
rapidly. Alford has been a strong voice behind this line of
reasoning, arguing that ANCs’ “disproportionate share of” 8(a)
contracts has adversely affected the Black business community,
pointing to specific instances of what he considers “abusive”
contracting in which ANCs act as “fronts for large non-Native
contractors” rather than subcontracting to other minority
259
Alford’s latest example illustrating these alleged
businesses.
problems was the awarding of a contract to an ANC to provide
portable classrooms in Mississippi at a price of thirty-nine million
dollars, even when a local African American business was available
to do the work at a quoted price of twenty-five million dollars and
260
had decades of previous experience doing the exact same work.
Similar grievances have come from Steve Denlinger, President of
the Latin American Management Association, who relayed the

255. See Miller, supra note 26, at A1.
256. Alford Statement, supra note 177, at 3.
257. Id.
258. Pete Homer, Congressional Probe of Alaska Native Corporations an
Attack on Indian Country’s Economic Future, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Mar. 19,
2005, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096410593.
259. See Nat’l Indian Bus. Ass’n, supra note 177.
260. Experiences and Challenges of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, Before the H.
Select Comm. on Katrina Response Investigation (Dec. 6, 2005) (statement of
Harry C. Alford, President/CEO, The National Black Chamber of Commerce,
Inc.).

05__YANG.DOC

2006]

1/10/2007 8:49 AM

ANC CONTRACTING PREFERENCES

351

complaint of five employees of an 8(a) company.261
They
complained that Chugach Alaska Corp., after being sole-sourced a
one hundred million dollar contract for work within New Mexico,
subcontracted out of state rather than to their New Mexico
business which had previously performed that contract and had
262
The Women
expected to be subcontracted by Chugach.
Impacting Public Policy group has likewise spoken out, stating that
its members have “lost opportunities to ANCs” due to the ANC
263
edge in the 8(a) Program.
Arguments in support of special treatment for ANCs primarily
cite two ways in which these corporations are different than other
small and disadvantaged 8(a) businesses. First, the contracting
preferences accorded to ANCs under the 8(a) Program derive from
a political relationship with the federal government unique to
264
Native Americans. Proponents of this argument frame the issue
as “warring tensions between competing, and arguably
irreconcilable, clusters of public policy issues,” seeing the
procurement policy of competition pitted against “federal Indian
policy,” including Congress’ obligations to Alaska Natives under
265
ANCSA. Under this line of reasoning, the federal government’s
policy on Indians, including the 8(a) ANC edge, is “rooted in the
extraordinary government-to-government relationship of the
266
Federal Government and Indian tribes,” which is expressed in the
267
Indian Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and
268
The ANC edge is thus justified even if it grants
other laws.
261. See Nat’l Indian Bus. Ass’n., supra note 177.
262. Id.
263. Northern Lights and Procurement Plights: The Effect of the ANC Program
on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations, Before the H. Comm. on
Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Ann Sullivan on behalf of Women Impacting Public Policy),
available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/WIPP%20-%20Sullivan%20
Testimony.pdf.
264. See Northern Lights and Procurement Plights: The Effect of the ANC
Program on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H.
Comm. on Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement of Chris McNeil, Jr., Chairman, Native American Contractors
Association), available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/NACA%20%20McNeil%20Testimony.pdf. [hereinafter McNeil Statement].
265. William K. Walker, Feature Comment: Alaska Native Participation in
Government Contracts: Victims of Success, 47, no. 28 GOV’T CONTRACTOR 1, 1
(2005).
266. Id. at 4.
267. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
268. See Walker, supra note 265, at 4–7.
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preferences over and above those given to other small minority
businesses because Native Americans “have a lexical first priority
269
in the distribution of Government benefits.”
Second, ANCs are responsible for benefiting entire
communities of Alaska Native shareholders, while other minority
270
businesses are geared for individual success. Supporters use this
argument to re-characterize the GAO’s data regarding ANCs’
participation in 8(a) contracting as “[a] [s]liver of the [p]ie,” noting
that the thirteen percent of all 8(a) contract dollars in 2004 were
awarded to ANCs that “represent 100,000 Alaska Native
shareholders,” while the other eighty-seven percent were doled out
“to roughly 9000 individually owned 8(a) companies”—a powerful
271
contrast designed to highlight the greater need of ANCs.
Additionally, supporters point out that ANCs, because they incur
high administrative costs that are unusual for business entities, such
as the costs of selecting land and operating a department to
administer land, are “structurally noncompetitive and inherent
272
money-losers.” Thus, if they have an edge in the 8(a) Program, it
is in part to compensate them for these additional burdens.
C. Solutions and Alternatives
To sum up the discussion thus far, since the ANC edge has the
potential to return dividend income to Alaska Native shareholders
as well as to create jobs and promote other development for
Alaska Natives, a blunt approach such as removal of ANCs from
273
On the other hand, a major
the program appears unwise.
criticism of ANCs’ use of their edge is that such dividends, jobs,
274
and other benefits simply are insufficient in magnitude.
Additionally, many worry about excessive circumvention of the
competition policy underlying the Act and the 8(a) Program arising

269. Id.
270. See Northern Lights and Procurement Plight:, The Effect of the ANC
Program on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H.
Comm. on Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong.
(2006) (statement of Helvi Sandvik, President, NANA Development
Corporation), available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/NANA%20%20Sandvik%20Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Sandvik Statement] (pointing out
that NANA Development Corporation provides benefits to its 11,200
shareholders, which is the “very significant distinction between a traditional,
individually owned 8(a) company and an ANC-owned 8(a) company”).
271. McNeil Statement, supra note 264.
272. Walker, supra note 265, at 6.
273. See supra Part VI.B.1.
274. See supra Part VI.B.2.
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from the unique advantages available to ANCs.275
Other
complaints include negative impacts on the taxpayer dollar, other
small and 8(a) businesses, and even the ANCs and Alaska Natives
276
themselves.
1. Some Possibilities and Dilemmas. One clear need above
all emerges from this overview: to strike a balance between
discontinuing these advantages simply because of negative
sentiment toward the enormous success of unlikely parties and
allowing these advantages to be exploited to the point where the
rich (and non-disadvantaged) companies get richer at the expense
of minority small businesses, overcharged taxpayers, and
increasingly dependent ANCs. Ideal solutions would allow the
benefit of potential for job and dividend generation to continue
and grow while adopting measures that target the costs in a focused
way.
a. GAO Proposed Solutions. Though the 2006 GAO reports
277
provided some answers, the investigations primarily created two
additional phenomena, neither of which is particularly conducive to
the task of finding a lasting solution to the real problems associated
with the ANC edge. First, the investigations inspired rounds of
finger-pointing and blame-shifting between the different entities
responsible for oversight of contracts performed by 8(a) businesses.
For instance, the GAO’s report on ANC participation in Army
security guard contracts indicated the Army contracting official did
not adequately ensure that the ANCs are complying with the limits
278
In response, the official simply “pointed to
on subcontracting.
279
[the] SBA.” The SBA, in turn, passed the blame to institutional
defects, and in effect Congress, contending that the “issues
addressed in the report come from activities that are part of the
280
program as Congress designed it.”

275. See supra Part VI.A.1.
276. See supra Parts VI.A.2, VI.B.3–4.
277. See supra Part V.
278. GAO GUARD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 145, at 15.
279. Id.
280. Northern Lights and Procurement Plight: The Effect of the ANC Program
on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H. Comm. on
Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Calvin Jenkins, Deputy Associate Deputy Administrator, Office of
Government Contracting and Business Development, U.S. Small Business
Administration), available at http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/SBA%20%20Jenkins%20Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Jenkins Statement].
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Second, the reports have set off a battle of anecdotes and a
war of statistics. To put the GAO report’s data on the ANC share
of 8(a) contracting “in perspective,” the president of NANA
Development Corporation cited another study showing that Alaska
Native companies were awarded only 0.2 percent of all federal
contracts from 1998 to 2003 and only 6.22 percent of all 8(a)
281
More specifically, the toll of the
contracts from 2001 to 2003.
ANC edge on taxpayers is muddled rather than brought to light by
the GAO’s report. The GAO reported that government agencies
contract with—in particular, sole-source to—ANCs in order to
“quickly, easily, and legally award contracts for any value” while
meeting not only its small business goals but also its small,
disadvantaged business goals, taking “credit in more than one small
282
Several examples were then cited in which
business category.”
agencies contracted on a sole-source basis to ANCs especially
when under-staffed because such contracts consumed less
283
This may suggest that
administrative resources and time.
contracting with ANCs translates into lower administrative costs in
government procurement. Yet, at the same time, the report also
offered a counter example to these administrative savings, where
an agency went to great lengths to accept ANC contracts even
when the proposal price was unsatisfactory, resulting in both a
higher cost of the ultimate contract as well as resources consumed
284
in extensive negotiations over price.
Is the net result a wash?
The president of NANA
Development Corporation argued in response to the GAO report
that time and money are spent “up front” in an 8(a) contract to an
ANC in negotiations, “rather than analyzing multiple proposals
and references after contract terms, conditions, and requirements
[are] published” as in a normal contract and that, as a result, the
negotiation process in awarding an 8(a) contract “ensures the best
285
However, whether the costs of
value for the government.”
negotiation are always lower than the costs of analyzing multiple
proposals in unclear.
Also, the GAO report could not confirm or deny the existence
of “an explicit link between the revenues generated from the 8(a)
Program and benefits provided to shareholders,” except to say that
281. Sandvik Statement, supra note 270.
282. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 16, 19.
283. Id. at 16–18.
284. See id. at 17 (citing an example wherein the State Department “negotiated
extensively for over a month” with an ANC only to accept a final price that “was
still slightly over the government’s estimate”).
285. Sandvik Statement, supra note 270.
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benefits—including dividends, scholarships, and cultural
programs—do exist, but that a high level of 8(a) revenues do not
286
necessarily guarantee a high level of shareholder benefit. For this
conclusion, the report cited three examples: one example in which
a corporation with high 8(a) revenues provided a high level of
benefits, a second example in which a corporation with high 8(a)
activity provided a low level of benefits, and a third example in
which an ANC with low 8(a) participation still provided a high
287
level of benefits. Indeed, the president of NANA Development
Corporation cited his corporation as an example of an ANC that
288
pays almost all of its profits out as dividends.
Finally, most of the results of the legislative investigations are
subject to multiple interpretations. For one, critics of the GAO
findings argue that the reports treat ANCs unfairly by attributing
289
to ANCs problems that are universal to federal procurement.
Thus, defenders argue that ANCs have been made “a convenient
scapegoat” for “well-documented systemic problems with the
290
Also using this strategy, the SBA was
procurement system.”
quick to point out that federal dollars devoted to other small
disadvantaged businesses, such as women-owned businesses,
disabled veterans’ businesses, and small businesses in general had
291
also increased significantly during the same period of time.
Moreover, supporters of ANCs emphasize that the report “is
292
remarkable for what it does not contain,” noting that it “did not
cite any waste, fraud, or abuse on the part of ANCs,” but rather
focused on the inadequacy of the SBA and contracting officials
293
Others hasten to add their
rather than the contractors.
interpretation that the report did not “call for legislative changes”

286. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 24.
287. Id. at 24–25.
288. Sandvik Statement, supra note 270.
289. See id. (arguing that the GAO report relied on “anecdotes and vignettes
[that] are equally applicable to any aspect of the federal contracting domain”).
290. McNeil Statement, supra note 264.
291. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, app. II at 53–54.
292. McNeil Statement, supra note 264.
293. Northern Lights and Procurement Plights: The Effect of the ANC Program
on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H. Comm. on
Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statements of Helvi Sandvik, President, NANA Development Corporation; Julie
Kitka, President, Alaska Federation of Natives; Charles Totemoff, Chief
Executive Officer, Chenega Corporation), available at http://reform.house.gov/
GovReform/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=45302 [hereinafter Sandvik,
Kitka & Totemoff Statement].
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to the 8(a) Program.294 To this, the critics respond that “nowhere in
the GAO report is there a statement that the contracts were
awarded to ANCs because of the quality or value of the
295
The SBA, meanwhile, offers its own
performance offered.”
interpretation that “there is no indication within this report of
wrongdoing by any participant in the program” and that it actually
represents a criticism of flaws in the 8(a) Program “as Congress
296
designed it.”
The recommendations proposed by the GAO’s reports in 2006
focused primarily on oversight by the SBA and compliance with
297
the regulations by contracting agencies. These measures should
be taken because enforcement of the regulations already in place
would help ensure that the ANC edge in practice conforms to its
legal parameters. However, conformity with the legal parameters
of the 8(a) Program does not seem to be the heart of the problem,
and increased oversight and compliance may not be enough if the
problems which have inspired the bulk of criticism are not that the
laws are being violated or even circumvented. As many have
pointed out, the GAO reports did not cite or even suggest outright
298
fraud by ANCs or other contractors. Rather, the implication of
the findings is that the spirit of the laws is being violated by
practices which are perfectly legal but either lie at the outer edges
of legality of the preferences or take advantage of loopholes in the
laws.
For example, the ANC practice of owning multiple
subsidiaries that also participate in the 8(a) Program and creating
new subsidiaries to lengthen the life of existing subsidiaries’ 8(a)
contracts when they expire is fully legitimate under the regulations
299
but runs counter to the spirit of the 8(a) regulatory framework.
Thus, strengthening oversight and compliance may not be the
complete answer; rather, the design of the system is due for an

294. McNeil Statement, supra note 264.
295. Northern Lights and Procurement Plights, The Effect of the ANC Program
on Federal Procurement and Alaska Native Corporations Before the H. Comm. on
Government Reform and the H. Comm. on Small Business, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman, H. Comm. on Government Reform),
available
at
http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/TMD%20ANC%20Opener.pdf.
296. Jenkins Statement, supra note 280 (emphasis added).
297. See GAO GUARD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 145, at 32–33; see also
GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 39–41.
298. Sandvik, Kitka & Totemoff Statement, supra note 293.
299. See GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 27–28 (“ANCs use their ability
to own multiple businesses in the 8(a) program, as allowed by law, in different
ways.”) (emphasis added).
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overhaul. Some possible solutions and their ability to do this are
explored in the rest of this discussion.
b. Other Possible Solutions.
One solution that would
seemingly silence all complaints against the ANC edge is to limit it.
Short of the drastic measure of taking ANCs out of the program
300
altogether, one method might be to discontinue sole-sourcing of
federal contracts for ANCs. This, however, may effectively take
ANCs out of the 8(a) Program. While it would certainly alleviate
practically all of the above concerns regarding the ANC edge, it
raises serious fairness concerns if other minority 8(a) firms
continue to be sole-sourced contracts. Moreover, because the link
between sole-source 8(a) revenue and benefits to Alaska Native
301
shareholders has not conclusively been established or disproved,
removing the sole-source advantages may be unduly harsh.
A more focused solution is perhaps to discontinue the practice
of automatically qualifying ANCs as socially and economically
302
disadvantaged for purposes of eligibility for the 8(a) Program.
This measure would not, however, cure any current abuses by
ANCs that are already in the program and is only likely to keep out
ANCs that have yet to enter the federal contracting arena and are,
as a result, much less well-off. Thus, it may be unsound as a matter
of fairness.
Another interesting solution that has been proposed is to
create a special procurement program for “representative
organizations,” businesses like ANCs that represent the economic
interests of many minority individuals and communities rather than
303
This alternative would indeed be best at
individual businesses.
addressing the unique economic needs of ANCs and other Native
corporations, but depending on the features of such a program, it
seems to have the potential to anger other small minority
businesses even further because it would merely accentuate the
uniqueness and the special preferential status of ANCs.
Two solutions hold the most potential for addressing the ANC
edge’s negative impact on competition, the taxpayer, and other
8(a) businesses at once. One is to remove the exemption of ANC
and tribally-owned businesses from the dollar limitation threshold
304
on sole-source awards. This would certainly mitigate the extent
300. See Nat’l Indian Bus. Ass’n., supra note 177.
301. GAO 8(A) REPORT, supra note 146, at 24.
302. See 43 U.S.C. § 1626(e)(1) (2000); 13 C.F.R. § 124.109(a)(2), (4) (2006).
303. Walker, supra note 265, at 7.
304. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.506 (detailing at what dollar threshold an 8(a)
procurement must be competed among eligible participants).
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to which ANCs can circumvent the competitive process for
receiving government contract awards, as well as reduce stress on
the taxpayer and put ANCs on a level playing field with other 8(a)
businesses. The SBA’s proposed changes to the 8(a) Program in
April 2006, on the heels of the GAO report, provide solutions of
this nature, by first removing the exemption for joint ventures
between ANCs/tribally-owned businesses and non-8(a) entities and
then by enabling NHOs to receive contracts above the competitive
305
threshold, but only with the Department of Defense.
These are steps in the right direction, but they may not fully
alleviate the problems associated with the absence of dollar
limitations on sole-source contracts. For one, removing the
exemption for an ANC/non-ANC joint venture does not, in theory,
prevent the same large contract from being awarded to one of the
ANC’s subsidiaries and then subcontracted up to forty-nine
percent to that same joint venturer. This highlights what is likely a
recurring dilemma in the search for effective regulatory solutions:
that any changes to the system may well create more loopholes
while closing existing ones, especially given that at least some
ANCs have become sophisticated business entities with the full
range of corporate reorganization maneuvers at their disposal, a
phenomenon highlighted in the GAO’s report.
The other solution is to directly limit the sole-sourced awards
to corporations by requiring an ANC receiving a sole-sourced
contract to: (1) subcontract the work to other minority or 8(a)
306
businesses; (2) perform the entire work; or (3) perform a
percentage of the work much higher than fifty percent. The second
and third route are plagued with the possibility that ANCs’ access
to federal contracts may be drastically reduced as a side effect
because their much-publicized inexperience with respect to some
of the military and defense contracts they have received might
make it either impossible or enormously costly for them to receive
307
such contracts. The first option, a requirement to subcontract to
other minority or 8(a) firms, seems to be the most sensible in that it
not only prevents non-disadvantaged firms like Wackenhut from
exploiting the subcontracting loophole, but it also increases
305. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Sole Source 8(a)
Awards to Small Business Concerns Owned by Native Hawaiian Organizations, 71
Fed. Reg. 34,831 (June 16, 2006) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 219.805-1).
306. See Yasmin Anwar, Small-business Aid Goes to Few, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, Aug. 12, 2001, at 1A (citing suggestions to this effect by some 8(a)
firms in Hawaii that have received a disproportionately lower amount of work
from the program).
307. O’Harrow & Higham, supra note 30, at A1.
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minority participation in and access to federal contracts, alleviating
the exclusion of other 8(a) businesses from the procurement pie.308
However, a key policy dilemma is raised by the two favored
solutions: while they may succeed in mitigating the ANC edge, they
may, at the same time, devastate the ANCs that are now dependent
309
on government contracts for survival. These two modifications of
the ANC edge may seem justified in part because there is a serious
question of whether certain ANCs, those that have seen the most
contracting successes, are still “economically disadvantaged” in
310
light of those successes. For instance, in June 2005 the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) discontinued its practice, dating back to the
passage of ANCSA in 1971, of exempting ANC shareholder
dividends from federal tax levies on property, in part because ANC
dividends, at least for some ANCs, “have increased substantially
311
over the years,” “indicating there’s money to be captured.”
The argument that ANC contracting advantages should be
discontinued on the grounds that certain ANCs have become so
successful that they no longer need such assistance is subject to a
paradox of sorts, in that practically the only reason that certain
ANCs have become so successful has been their privileged access
to enormous government contracts with no dollar limitation. To
illustrate, statistics indicate that the vast majority of federal
contracts awarded to ANCs and other tribally-owned businesses
312
between 1999 and 2003 were sole-sourced. This means that if the
ANC edge is removed, a real question remains as to whether
ANCs would not experience just as quick and drastic a flight into
the state of near-bankruptcy as some of them endured before
313
taking advantage of government contracts.
The downward flight might happen in several ways. For one,
subjecting ANCs to the same dollar limitation as other minority
small businesses may conceivably lead to a dramatic reduction in
314
the benefit being trickled down to Alaska Native shareholders.
For instance, Michael Brown’s justification for the exemption from
sole-source dollar limitation for ANCs was that ANCs have greater
needs than the usual small business; in his words, “if it’s a guy and
308. Wayne, supra note 120, at C2; Alford Statement, supra note 177.
309. See supra Part VI.A.2.
310. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.104 (2006).
311. See Paula Dobbyn, IRS Alters Policy on Native Firms, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, June 16, 2005, at F1.
312. See Scherer, supra note 4, at 28 (providing a chart on “Government
Contracts to Tribal Companies”).
313. See id.
314. See Connolly, supra note 106, at A1.
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his wife, then a $3- million project can provide significant economic
benefit . . . [b]ut if you’re dealing with a tribe with several million
315
people, you’ve got to have larger contracts.” Some 2003 statistics
show that there is a real trickle-down phenomenon: $78 million of
the $2.8 billion in revenues—slightly below one third of one
316
percent—was translated into shareholder profits. Imposing three
million and five million dollar limits on the value of contracts
ANCs may be sole-sourced may mean that each native shareholder
317
would see dramatically leaner checks.
That potential reduction in welfare might not be as drastic if
ANCs were able to replace one $500 million contract with either
hundreds of sole-source contracts under the dollar limitation or a
single $500 million contract won through the competitive bidding
process. The ability of ANCs to competitively win such enormous
awards, however, is uncertain because their receipts of multimillion
dollar sole-source contracts based on the ANC edge indicate
nothing about their capability to perform the work at the lowest
cost when compared to multiple bidders, and the laws that have
enabled them to receive such sole-source awards thus far do not
318
Even relatively modest
encourage or develop that ability.
cutbacks to the system that produces the ANC edge, such as higher
restrictions on subcontracting, could translate to dramatic
reductions in ANC success. For instance, the GAO report on the
Army’s reliance on ANC firms for its security guard contracts
stated that before the sole-source contracts were awarded, the
Defense Contract Management Agency had rated one of the two
ANCs as “high risk” in performance due to inexperience in service
319
provision. However, the contract was awarded because this “risk
was mitigated somewhat” due to the firm’s choice to “team up with
a subcontractor experienced in providing security guard
320
services.”
As a matter of fact, the legal advantages that allow ANCs to
receive contracts of such enormous proportion without going
through the competitive process merely cultivate a dependency on
321
those advantages. This all means that the inquiry of whether the
ANC edge ought to be discontinued runs into a dilemma: the legal
advantages have fostered not an independent ability to compete in
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Miller, supra note 26, at A1.
Bauman, supra note 209, ¶¶ 2–3.
See Connolly, supra note 106, at A1.
See supra Part VI.A.2.
GAO GUARD PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 145, at 13.
Id.
See supra Part VI.A.2; see also Nadler, supra note 195.
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the marketplace but a dependence on that assistance without which
it is doubtful that ANCs could continue their current success.322
Thus, it is difficult to take away these advantages without
substantially hurting their intended beneficiaries.
2. Caveats and Alternatives to Legislative Reform. One
caveat is the possibility that modifying the ANC edge may open the
door to other reforms which are undesirable at this stage of Native
323
Americans’ and Alaska Natives’ economic development.
Leaders of the Native American community have spoken out
against any drastic changes to the 8(a) Program’s advantages for
businesses owned by Indian Tribes and ANCs, warning that, while
negative congressional and media attention has been focused on
ANCs, reforms based on such attention may harm tribal federal
contracting in the rest of the country as well as open the door to
erosion of tribal gaming and other rights and programs for all
324
Native Americans.
Moreover, before any enactment of concrete measures, ANCs
should be given more time to prove that advantages from their
contract awards truly do benefit Alaska Natives who would
otherwise be impoverished. For instance, Neal Fried, Alaska’s
Department of Labor economist, offered his opinion that ANCs
“are just starting to make an impact on the tribes,” suggesting that
given more time, their contracting activities may lead to more
325
pronounced improvement in the welfare of Alaska Natives. This
is especially true in light of the fact that some ANCs are only
326
beginning to be successful in the 8(a) contracting arena.
Finally, there are some alternatives to substantive legislative
reform for mitigating the ANC edge’s negative effects. Procedural
protection, for one, should be more fully explored. For example,
the law does contain a provision that presents possibilities for
limiting the exclusionary effect of the ANC edge on small

322. See id.
323. See Pete Homer, Congressional Probe of Alaska Native Corporations an
Attack on Indian Country’s Economic Future, Indian Country Today, Mar. 19,
2005, available at http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096410593; see
also Nat’l Indian Bus. Ass’n., supra note 177.
324. See id.
325. Connolly, supra note 106, at A1.
326. Sam Bishop, Expansion of Alaska Native No-bid Deals Sparks Debate,
FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER, June 25, 2006, ¶ 1, available at
http://newsminer.com/2006/06/25/590/ (noting that “several Native firms from
Interior Alaska have a growing share of the work just as some members of
Congress are questioning the rules . . .”).
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businesses outside of the 8(a) Program,327 though as far as known
by the author it has not been used. Under the SBA’s own
regulations, it may make a determination that accepting an 8(a)
award would create “adverse impact on an individual small
business, a group of small businesses located in a specific
geographical location, or other small business programs,” in which
328
The limitation is
case it will not accept the award under 8(a).
“designed to protect small business concerns which are performing
Government contracts awarded outside the 8(a) BD program,” and
in certain circumstances the adverse impact is presumed to exist,
such as when a small business not under the 8(a) Program has been
329
performing the contract in question for at least two years. Thus,
if the contracts to ANCs continue to expand, the potential for that
expansion to squeeze out other small businesses from the
government procurement pie may be curbed by this adverse impact
determination. However, there are significant drawbacks to this
tool. It is unable to protect other 8(a) businesses, and contracts for
construction, a large, important category of contracts, are
considered “new requirements” and are immune from the adverse
330
impact determinations.
Most importantly, measures that can be taken by ANCs
themselves rather than legislators should be emphasized. Some
suggested strategies have focused on reforming both the structure
and the federal contracting practices of ANCs so that they become
more involved in developing skills to compete in the national and
international markets independently, without special sole-source
331
contracting advantages. For instance, it has been suggested that
they should integrate boards of directors into daily management,
train native shareholders to participate in running the companies,
332
and set goals for winning competitive contracts. These measures
would certainly reduce the dependency on sole-source awards
fostered by the ANC edge. Given time, ANCs may then become
more able competitors, alleviating the concerns with regard to
competition policy, taxpayer bills, and exclusion of other 8(a)
businesses.

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See 13 C.F.R. § 124.504(c) (2006).
Id.
Id.
13 C.F.R. § 124.504(c)(1)(B).
Nadler, supra note 195.
Id.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, while the ANC edge has undeniably led to jobs and
dividends for Alaska Natives, it has also imposed costs on
competition itself, taxpayers, other small and minority businesses,
and ANCs themselves. The most serious flaw in the unique legal
preferences accorded to ANCs is not the creation of loopholes that
allow large corporations like Wackenhut to access government
333
This
contracts to which they would not otherwise have access.
problem, while serious and pervasive, can be alleviated in a direct
and focused way through more rigorous legal limitations on
334
subcontracting.
The more serious problem, it seems, lies in the potential of the
ANC edge to foster a dependence by ANCs. This undermines the
possibility of reforms that would control the ANC edge’s impact on
taxpayers and other 8(a) businesses without significantly hurting
335
Alaska Natives at the same time. Therefore, any reforms should
primarily target reduction and prevention of a permanent reliance
on the ANC edge. Perhaps most importantly, ANCs should focus
on developing other economic activities besides government
contracting with the defense sector as a way to promote business
development and the ability to compete effectively in the
marketplace on a self-sufficient basis. These abilities could reduce
their reliance on the ANC edge and thus alleviate its negative
impact on competition, taxpayers, and other 8(a) participants.

333. See Wayne, supra note 120, at C2.
334. See supra notes 306–308 and accompanying text.
335. See supra Part VI.C.1.B.

